Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act by Beck, Steven R.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 6 September 1991 Article 3
Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Steven R. Beck
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven R. Beck, Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1242 (1991)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol76/iss6/3
NOTES
INTENT AS AN ELEMENT OF PREDATORY PRICING
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
INTRODUCTION
The intent requirement in predatory pricing analysis under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act' has generated significant controversy.
Of the four circuit courts of appeal that have recently considered the
issue, two maintained that intent is an element of the violation and
two effectively abolished the intent requirement by refusing to ad-
mit evidence of intent in predatory pricing cases. The issue merits
careful consideration because evidence of intent traditionally has
played a major role in predatory pricing jurisprudence. Its elimina-
tion would signal a drastic change in policy away from the prohibi-
tion of predatory pricing and toward per se lawfulness of predatory
pricing.
A complete test for predatory pricing must consider intent.
Simply put, as a theoretical matter, some types of predatory pricing
cannot be detected except through evidence of intent. Moreover,
special concerns within the legal system support the utility of an in-
tent requirement. An improved test for predatory pricing will em-
ploy intent in conjunction with two other factors, namely, the
plausibility of recoupment and the relation of price to cost. This
Note justifies these conclusions.2
Part I of this Note defines both predatory pricing and intent.
Part II examines the present legal framework and the split among
the circuit courts. Part III demonstrates the utility of an intent re-
quirement in a limited group of scenarios where other tests fail to
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
2 Another recent Note has taken a different view of this debate. The author con-
cluded that federal antitrust law should not consider intent evidence because federal law
serves the goals of efficiency and competition, while state laws provide "shields behind
which the warriors of the market place can protect themselves from their rivals' unethi-
cal tactics." Note, Predatory Pricing Strategies: The Relevance of Intent Under Antitrust, Unfair
Competition, and Tort Law, 64 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 607, 628 (1990) (authored by Michael C.
Quinn). This Note, while essentially agreeing with Mr. Quinn as to the goals of federal
antitrust law, disagrees with him as to how those goals can best be served. Through
economic analysis of those goals and of various methods of detecting predatory pricing,
this Note demonstrates that the goals of federal antitrust law are indeed better served by




produce a clear outcome. Part IV proposes a new framework that
utilizes intent. Finally, Part V illustrates the need for intent through




In the paradigmatic case of predatory pricing, a dominant firm
charges a price lower than its short run profit-maximizing price and
expands output in order to drive its rivals out of business. Once it
has succeeded in eliminating its competition, the dominant firm
raises its prices to a supracompetitive level, thus recouping its losses
with monopoly profits. 3 Variations of the classic case exist. Instead
of driving rivals out of business, the price cut may discipline rivals so
that they acquiesce and follow the dominant firm's lead in raising
price and lowering output.4 Another version involves a dominant
firm successfully establishing a predatory reputation that deters new
entry into the market.5 Under the right conditions, the dominant
firm may exclude rivals without incurring losses.6
Price predation can occur in three scenarios: excess capacity,
optimal capacity, and limit pricing.7 Excess capacity exists when a
firm, in order to maximize profits, must produce an output at which
its average total cost curve is downward sloping. 8 A firm may delib-
erately build excess capacity to deter entrants by showing them that
the firm is able to produce cheaply at high output levels in order to
squeeze them out of the market. More often, the cause of excess
capacity is a recession in the market that shrinks the market demand
3 FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 335 (2d ed. 1980). The first phase is referred to as the price-cutting period; the
second as the recoupment period.
4 Id. at 338. This variation is called price leadership.
5 Id. at 336-38. This version allegedly occurs in the context of a firm engaging in
classic predation in one distinct market to scare off potential entrants to its other
markets.
6 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ArrRusT LAW 714 (1978); PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 714.1b (1970 Supp.); Frederic M.
Scherer, Predatory Pricing and The Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 872-73,
880-82 (1976).
7 See generally Scherer, supra note 6 (describing the three scenarios).
8 See Scherer, supra note 6, at 872-73. The profit maximizing output occurs at Q*,
where the marginal revenue drive (MR) intersects the marginal cost curve (MC).
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curve.9 The last possible cause of excess capacity is successful entry
by a new firm. By satisfying a portion of the market demand, the
new entrant shrinks the demand curve enjoyed by the entrenched
firm.10 Predatory pricing in an excess capacity scenario is rare be-
cause it is easier to detect than the other two scenarios, and because
it requires the firm to incur losses rather than merely forgo profits in







9 Graphically, this means the demand curve will move downward and to the left.
10 Graphically, this is represented by the same movement of the demand curve






11 Scherer, supra note 6, at 876-78 (predatory pricing in most excess capacity scena-
rios would require the dominant firm to charge a price below both marginal cost and
average total cost, thereby making the strategy more conspicuous). But see Joseph F.
Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and The Evolution
of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 749-50 (1981) (price above marginal cost
may be exclusionary if rivals perceive "deep pocket"). A firm incurs losses when its
price is below its average total cost. Average total cost equals total cost divided by the
number of units produced. Average variable cost equals total variable cost divided by
the number of units. Variable costs change with levels of output; they are the costs of
inputs that must be increased to increase output. Marginal cost equals the cost of pro-
ducing the last unit.
For example, consider a firm that manufactures knife blades. The firm needs three
things in order to produce blades: a factory, steel, and labor. In the short run, when the
firm wants to produce more blades, it employs more steel and more labor, but does not
build a new factory. Therefore, steel and labor are variable costs, and the factory is a
fixed cost. Suppose the cost of maintaining the plant is $10. In order to produce 5
blades, the firm requires $10 of steel and $5 of labor. Total variable costs are $15 (10 +
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In contrast to excess capacity, optimal capacity occurs when the
dominant firm's profit-maximizing output coincides with the lowest
point on its average total cost curve-the output at which the firm
can operate most cost-efficiently is also the output which maximizes
profits. 12 A firm with optimal capacity can successfully deter or ex-
clude an equally efficient rival or entrant by charging a price that
undercuts the profit-maximizing price but nonetheless exceeds aver-
age total cost. In this way, the optimally adapted firm can engage in
successful predatory pricing without incurring losses. The key to
this phenomenon is that the entrenched firm leaves the rival or en-
trant with an extremely small residual demand curve.' 3 As the
residual demand curve shrinks, rivals and entrants must build plants
with increased cost-efficiency at lower levels of output. This is often
impossible because in most manufacturing markets, efficiency in-
5), and average variable cost is $3 (15 / 5). Total cost is the sum of all costs, fixed and
variable, which equals $25 (10 + 15), so average total cost is $5 (25 / 6). Note that if the
price is $4, the firm is losing $1 on every unit sold. Now suppose that the firm wants to
make another blade and it requires $2 of steel and $1 of labor to do so. The marginal







0 1 2 3 4 5 6
FIGURE 3
The term "equally efficient rival" connotes a firm that has the same cost curves as the
dominant firm, i.e., it has the same productive efficiency as the dominant firm.








13 The residual demand curve is the portion of the demand curve to the right of the
entrenched firm's output.
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creases with scale. Predatory pricing with optimal capacity is "more
apt to occur in the real world than the 'excess capacity' case."' 14
The limit pricing scenario I5 resembles the optimal capacity sce-
nario except that it contemplates a larger firm operating on a more
inelastic portion of the demand curve, leaving an even smaller
residual demand curve for rivals. 16 Operating at such high output
levels, the limit pricer can exclude equally efficient firms (i.e., leave a
prohibitively small residual demand curve) without lowering price
below either marginal or average total cost. The limit pricing firm,
like the optimally adapted firm, can successfully engage in predatory
pricing without incurring losses.
Predatory pricing in the optimal capacity and limit pricing sce-
narios are possible without incurring losses and are therefore more
rational than in the excess capacity scenario. Hence, there is reason
to believe that predatory pricing in the optimal capacity and limit
pricing scenarios is empirically more common than in the excess ca-
pacity scenario. 17 As a result, predatory pricing policy should em-














16 Elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity divided by the percent-
age change in price. It decreases as one proceeds downward on the curve. Hence, the
limit pricing firm operates on a lower portion of the demand curve than the optimal
capacity firm.
17 Scherer, supra note 6, at 883.
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excess capacity scenario.' 8
Commentators have discovered some general preconditions to
the occurrence of predatory pricing. First, the predator must pos-
sess significant market power before cutting price.' 9 Without con-
trol over the market price, the predator's price cut will be ignored;
without significant capacity, the predator will be unable to produce
enough output to quench the market demand at the lower price.
Second, entry into the market must be difficult.20 If this precondi-
tion is absent, the predator would be unable to sell at a monopoly
price long enough to recoup the lost profits. Soon after the
predator has eliminated its old rivals and raised the price, new com-
petitors will emerge and drive the price down.
While predatory pricing is susceptible to relatively clear theo-
retical definition, several practical considerations complicate its de-
tection as a legal matter. First, courts must take care not to prohibit
competitive price cuts. Antitrust law should encourage, not deter
the downward movement of prices toward cost through competi-
tion. 2' Furthermore, predatory pricing is rare because of the high
degree of risk involved in sacrificing profits today in hopes of uncer-
tain profits tomorrow. To make the scheme profitable the future
gains must exceed the sacrificed profits plus interest.22 Finally, the
task of differentiating predatory pricing from hard competition is
quite difficult in a litigation setting. Plaintiffs often bring suit during
the price-cutting stage before the alleged scheme has reached its
fruition.28 Moreover, because the defendant often already had
dominant power before the alleged predatory pricing period, it is
difficult to determine the effect the prices had on the defendant
18 See infra subpart III (B).
19 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975); Paul L.Joskow & Alvin K.
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 224-27
(1979).
20 Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 19, at 228-3 1; Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at
789-92. While it is generally accepted that entry must be difficult, there is no consensus
on the exact entry conditions that are sufficient or necessary for recoupment. See infra
text accompanying notes 166-70.
21 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986);
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227
(lst Cir. 1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
22 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
589; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 6, 71 L.b; ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARA-
DOX 149 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 267-69 (1981); Charles McCall, Predatory Pricing: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 32 ANTrrRusT BULL. 1, 5 (1987).
23 See, e.g., Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1400.
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firm's market power.24
Courts and commentators continue to struggle to develop a test
that adequately differentiates predatory pricing from hard competi-
tion. The relation of price to cost seems to be a helpful, yet some-
times inaccurate, indicator of the presence of predatory pricing;
above-cost pricing, as well as below-cost pricing, can be exclusion-
ary.25 Perhaps evaluation of intent can aid in the detection of preda-
tory pricing.
B. Intent
Critics of the use of intent in predatory pricing cases, and in
antitrust generally, often argue that the intent to compete and the
intent to monopolize are indistinguishable. 26 Yet some courts27 and
commentators 28 have distinguished the two. Indeed, many courts
have echoed one commentator's view that the only distinction be-
tween predatory pricing and hard competition is motive. 29
Two factors distinguish competitive and predatory intent: the
nature of the advantage exercised and the defendant's expecta-
tions. 30 The nature of the advantage depends on whether it is effi-
ciency-based. An efficiency advantage exists where the defendant
has lower costs than competitors, and therefore can maximize short-
run profits at prices lower than the prices at which its competitors
can maximize short-run profits. As a policy and incentive matter,
the law should allow firms to freely exercise efficiency advantages.
When a firm sacrifices short-run profits, however, it should have a
24 See, e.g., Bany Wright, 724 F.2d at 230 (defendant already possessed market power
and complaint alleged that defendant maintained its market power through predatory
pricing).
25 See infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402; Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins.,
784 F.2d 1325, 1338-39 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 788 F.2d 1223 (1986); Barry Wright, 724
F.2d at 232. The argument is that both the predator and the fierce competitor intend to
drive rivals out of business.
27 See infra notes 50-82.
28 R. BORK, supra note 22, at 138; LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 111 (1977).
29 The commentator is L. SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 111. Cases citing Sullivan
include Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 890
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 741 F.2d 1381 (1984); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E.John-
son Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Richter Con-
crete v. Hilltop Concrete, 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil,
642 F.2d 845, 853-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981); Chillicothe Sand &
Gravel v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980).
SO William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1035 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); R. BORK, supra note 22, at 138; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 111; see also RICHARD POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAw-AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (1976) (advocating search for intent by eliminating the possibil-
ity of any legitimate intents).
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justifiable reason. The defendant's expectation of eliminating rivals
and reaping monopoly profits is not a justifiable reason under anti-
trust laws that prohibit predatory pricing. The defendant possesses
predatory intent when she knows that her price does not maximize
short-run profits and the "anticipated benefits" of her price depend
on either disciplining or eliminating rivals or deterring entry, thus
"enhanc[ing] the firm's long-term ability to reap the benefits of mo-
nopoly power." 3'
One may prove intent by either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence. Direct evidence consists of statements made by the actor re-
garding his mental state. Examples of direct evidence of predatory
intent would include internal memoranda and minutes of meetings
revealing plans to sacrifice profits to deter entry or drive a rival out
of the market.3 2 Circumstantial evidence includes any statement or
conduct that may be used to infer intent, but does not directly reveal
mental state. Circumstantial evidence also includes internal memo-
randa and minutes; however, unlike direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence contains derogatory comments or plans consistent with
predation such as pricing below cost, surveillance of rivals, sham liti-
gation, blocking rivals' credit, disseminating misinformation, ex-
panding output, and conduct in furtherance of such plans.33 Other
examples of circumstantial evidence include the actual conduct of
below-cost pricing, surveillance, sham litigation, blocking credit,
disseminating misinformation, and expanding output. The di-
rect/circumstantial distinction is important because in addition to
differing in content, the two possess different strengths and weak-
nesses for detecting predatory pricing. In particular, those who op-
pose the use of intent focus their criticisms on direct evidence and
the derogatory memorandum type of circumstantial evidence. 34
31 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035. This definition finds support in other case law. See, e.g.,
H.J. Inc. v. ITT, 867 F.2d 1531 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 876 F.2d 59 (1989); Directory
Sales Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987); Southern
Pacific Comm. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005
(1985). Professor Posner has suggested a similar approach. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at
190 (instructing courts "to examine the full range of possible reasons for a particular
pricing policy and to infer predation only after rejecting all other possible reasons ....
such as declining demand or obsolete plant, as implausible").
32 E.g., " 'Put [Kelley] out of business. Do whatever it takes. Squish him like a bug
.... [I]f it mean[s] give the stuff away, give it away.'" Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1989) (quoting the defendant's regional vice-
president).
33 Pacific Eng'g Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee, 551 F.2d 790, 793 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977); Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 778; Joskow & Klevorick, supra
note 19, at 259.
34 See infra text accompanying notes 187-214. This Note assumes that predatory
pricing does exist. There is strong support for this assumption. See Cargill Inc. v.
Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986); McCall, supra note 22, at 4. But see R. BoRiK,
supra note 22, at 154; Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 265-318. By prohibiting predatory
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Now that the reader knows a little about the nature of the beast,
she is likely to ask, "why do I care?". The answer lies in the vague
statutory framework, the sparse and reluctant Supreme Court guid-
ance, and the ever-changing patchwork that looms in the lower fed-
eral courts. Each of these three sources of law has failed to
authoritatively establish the proper role, if any, of intent within
predatory pricing jurisprudence.
II
THE PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Background
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits both completed and at-
tempted monopolization.3 5 'Completed monopolization entails the
dual elements of monopoly power and willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power.36 By contrast, the attempt offense requires
three elements: specific intent to monopolize, anticompetitive con-
duct, and dangerous probability of success.3 7 Although the two
section 2 offenses have different requirements, predatory pricing
constitutes a violation under both the completed and attempted mo-
nopolization theories.3 8
pricing, the law also makes this assumption. In addition, this Note assumes, as a policy
matter, that predatory pricing does not constitute an antitrust violation unless it has the
potential to exclude an equally efficient rival or a potential entrant that may become
equally efficient. Both the legislative history and the case law support this assumption.
See infra note 116. Finally, this Note assumes that prices with exclusionary effects do not
give rise to a violation unless they are accompanied by a predatory intent; however,
prices below some measure of cost (at the very least, average variable cost) justify an
inference of intent. Prices that exclude competitors by accident or with competitive jus-
tification are legal. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1400 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230 (1st Cir. 1983); Padfc Eng'g, 551 F.2d at 795.
35 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony."). Section 7 of the Clayton Act gives
standing to private plaintiffs to sue for treble damages. Id § 15a ("[A]ny person who
shall be injured... by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
for ... and shall recover threefold the damages.").
36 United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); cf U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 680 F. Supp. 361, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (court recognized requirement
of "general intent" for completed monopolization offense), rev'd on other grounds, 861
F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989).
37 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. =lT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1027 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); but cf McGahee v. Northern Pro-
pane Gas, 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988) (excludes the conduct element), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
38 See Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986) ("predatory pricing is
an anticompetitive practice forbidden by the antitrust laws"); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (finding liability for predatory conduct and price discrimina-
tion under § 2). The Robinson-Patman Act also prohibits predatory pricing. See infra
text accompanying notes 180-86.
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In spite of the unlawfulness of predatory pricing, the Supreme
Court has failed to establish a test for predatory pricing. Two re-
cent cases, however, lend some guidance. In Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,39 the Court indirectly expressed
some approval of a price/cost test by describing predatory pricing
as pricing below some level of CoSt,4 0 but left a firm determination
of the legality of above cost pricing for another day. The Matsushita
Court also lent support to a recoupment test when it observed that
predation was impossible because of fierce competition and ease
of entry in the relevant market involved in that case.4 1 Finally, the
Court opined that predatory pricing is rare,42 and emphasized that
any legitimate test must not "discourag[e] legitimate price
competition." 43
In another case, Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort, Inc.,44 the Court de-
scribed predatory pricing as pricing "below an appropriate measure
of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run
and reducing competition in the long run."45 This description sup-
ports a test with both price/cost and intent factors. Although the
Court echoed the Matsushita sentiments regarding the rarity of pred-
atory pricing and the need to protect legitimate price competition, it
also implied that predatory pricing does exist.46 As in Matsushita,
the Court in Cargill refused to rule on the lawfulness of a price above
"incremental cost" where there is evidence of intent.47 Finally, Car-
gill clarified that intentional predation is aimed not "simply at in-
creasing market share[, but at] elimination of competition. ' 48
Through Matsushita and Cargill, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that although predatory pricing is rare, it may exist. Courts,
however, must be careful not to chill legitimate competition while
attempting to punish predators. Further, the Court implied support
for the use of three tools to detect predatory pricing: the relation of
39 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the case actually established the summary judgment stan-
dard for conspiracy under § I).
40 Id at 584-85 nn.8, 9 (citing inter alia, Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,
724 F.2d 227, 232-35 (1st Cir. 1983)). This description of predatory pricing justifies an
inference of support for the Areeda-Turner test. See infra note 50 for a description of
the Areeda-Turner test.
41 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590-93.
42 Id at 589.
43 Id at 594 (citing Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 234).
44 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (holding that plaintiff who alleged future predatory pricing
had standing for merger injunction).
45 Id at 117.
46 Id at 121 ("It would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a party
seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely because such injuries rarely
occur.").
47 Id at 117 n.12; see supra note 40.
48 Id at 117.
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price to cost, the plausibility of recoupment, and predatory intent.
Finally, the Court twice raised and left open the question of whether
pricing above cost with predatory intent is unlawful.
Given only the foregoing sparse and cryptic guidance, the lower
federal courts have struggled to create a test for predatory pricing.
Although the courts have not agreed on a single test, some general-
ization about their approaches is possible. A majority of the circuit
courts of appeals 49 adhere to a test that balances the results of the
Areeda-Turner test50 and intent. The majority test has three
prongs: (1) a price below average variable cost justifies a presump-
tion of intent, and thus, unlawfulness; (2) prices above average vari-
able cost but below average total cost are lawful without some
49 Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, 875 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1989); Indi-
ana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores, 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989); U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989); Mc-
Gahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1084 (1989); Western Concrete Structures v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-
Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1036 (1984); Sunshine Books v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982); Richter Con-
crete v. Hilltop Concrete, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982); William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1125 (1981); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980); Chillicothe
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980); Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). But see
Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 788
F.2d 1223 (1986).
Most district courts addressing the question have followed the same test. U.S.
Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 717 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Florida Fuels v. Belcher
Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1989); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 680
F. Supp. 361 (S.D. Fla. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989); Jays Foods v. Frito-Lay, 656 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
Raul Intern Corp. v. Sealed Power Corp., 586 F. Supp. 349 (D.N.J. 1984); Double H
Plastics v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 575 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aft'd, 732 F.2d 351 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F.
Supp. 739 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, 547 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aft'd, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982); In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); In the
Matter of General Foods Corp. 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984).
50 Areeda & Turner, supra note 19. The test purports to maximize allocative effi-
ciency. See infra section III (A)(3) (for a description of allocative efficiency) and section
III (B)(1) (showing failure to achieve goal). Although the orthodox version of the test
would prohibit all prices below marginal cost, policy and evidentiary concerns led the
authors to abandon the orthodox version in favor of a more practical test. The new test
prohibits prices below average variable cost until the output level where average variable
cost intersects with marginal cost. At outputs where marginal cost is between average
variable and average total cost, the test prohibits prices below marginal cost. At higher
outputs, the test prohibits only prices below average total cost. The test eliminates in-
tent as a factor and relies solely on the price/cost relation. See infra subpart III (B).
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independent evidence of intent; and (3) prices above average total
cost are presumed lawful.
Until 1983, no circuit court of appeals had eliminated the intent
requirement for predatory pricing violations. Since 1983, however,
two courts have abandoned the intent requirement, while in 1981
and 1988 two others reiterated its necessity to a correct determina-
tion of predatory pricing liability. To best understand the disagree-
ment, this Part will first examine the traditional majority position
advocated by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, and then evaluate the
criticisms of this position made by the First and Seventh Circuits.
B. The Split
In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. ,5
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had attempted to monopo-
lize the private label bread market through predatory pricing in vio-
lation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Both the plaintiff, Inglis,
and the defendant, Continental, were wholesale bakeries that sold
bread under both a private label and an advertised label. Private
label bread is made for a specific retailer and marketed under that
retailer's label. Advertised label bread is the same product as pri-
vate label bread, but it is marketed under a national brand name and
is sold to any retailer willing to buy. The profit margin on adver-
tised label bread, however, exceeded that of private label bread be-
cause the wholesale price of advertised label was higher than that of
private label.
Inglis claimed that Continental had engaged in predatory pric-
ing in the private label bread market and that, once it gained control
of that market, Continental intended to raise the private label price
so that sales of its advertised label bread would increase.5 2 Inglis
operated at a loss from 1967 until 1974 in order to meet Continen-
tal's allegedly predatory price cuts. In 1974, however, Inglis suc-
cumbed and ceased operations because of these significant, long-
term losses.
At trial, Inglis presented evidence of Continental's private label
prices and circumstantial evidence of Continental's intent. In Sep-
tember 1970, Continental lowered its price from 19 to 18 cents.
The price remained there until July 1972, when Continental re-
duced the price to 17.2 cents. In the summer of 1973, Continental
gradually began to raise its price. Inglis proved that Continental's
price was below average total cost from 1971 to 1974 and also
51 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
52 Dominance in the private label market would result in increased shelf space for
advertised label bread. Moreover, a higher private label price would increase demand
for the advertised label, because its price would become more attractive.
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presented some evidence that the price undercut average variable
cost briefly in 1972 and 1973. Inglis's circumstantial evidence of
intent included a middle management memorandum written in early
1974, soon after Continental began to raise its price, stating that
Inglis would not last another year; memoranda from salesmen
targeting Inglis's private label buyers; offers repeatedly made to
those buyers; and a report to Continental from consultants contain-
ing strategies to fight competition in the private label market.53 Ing-
lis presented no direct evidence of intent.
Continental offered three explanations for its pricing behavior.
First, it proved that the entire wholesale bread market was ex-
tremely competitive, and presented evidence tending to show that
Continental had no market power and that its pricing simply fol-
lowed the lead of the biggest wholesaler, Campbell-Taggart. 54 Sec-
ond, Continental showed that during the complaint period many
retailers started "captive" bakeries which left all the wholesalers
with tremendous excess capacity.55 Finally, Continental showed
that the federal government imposed a price freeze on all the whole-
salers during the summer of 1973 and alleged that its price increase
immediately after the lifting of the freeze stemmed not from the an-
ticipation of Inglis's demise, but rather from increasing costs. 56
The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to
the defendant because Inglis had not proved that Continental's
prices were below marginal cost.57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded for a new trial.58 The Circuit Court
held that a section 2 attempt entails three elements: a specific intent
53 One of the strategies was to maintain prices "to hasten wholesaler exit." Inglis,
668 F.2d at 1025.
54 Campbell-Taggart settled prior to trial.
55 Therefore, each wholesaler faced a shrinking demand curve and there were too
many wholesalers in the market to allow them to produce at an efficient output, i.e., near
the lowest point on their average total cost curve. See supra note 8. In order to survive, it
was necessary to incur losses in the short run.
56 Continental failed to explain why it did not take advantage of opportunities to
apply for a price increase in its private label bread, when it did so for its advertised label
bread.
57 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp.
410 (N.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982). The court reasoned that because of excess capacity, average variable cost ex-
ceeded marginal cost, and therefore average variable cost was not a good proxy for
marginal cost. Id. at 418. In the alternative, it granted a new trial because even if aver-
age variable cost was an acceptable proxy, Inglis's evidence was insufficient on that
point. Id.
58 The Ninth Circuit reversed because the district court erred in holding that
whether a cost is variable or fixed is not a jury question; however, the court also held
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (i.e., that the cost and intent
evidence were inconclusive), and therefore remanded instead of reinstating the jury ver-
dict. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1058.
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to control price or destroy competition, predatory conduct, and a
dangerous probability of success. Furthermore, these elements are
interdependent in that "[e]ach element interacts with the others in
significant and unexpected ways."'59
To make out a section 2 attempt claim by predatory pricing, the
"plaintiff must prove that the anticipated benefits of the defendant's
price depended on its tendency to discipline or eliminate competi-
tion and thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability to reap the
benefits of monopoly power."' 60 The court reiterated that the "ulti-
mate standard" was that "[p]redation exists when the justification of
these prices is based, not on their effectiveness in minimizing losses,
but on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market struc-
ture enabling the seller to recoup his losses."'1 Thus, predatory
pricing exists when the defendant consciously forgoes short run
profits in order to eliminate rivals and to subsequently recoup the
lost profits.
The court laid out what might be described as a sliding scale
test for predatory pricing using intent and the relation of price to
cost as the two variables. If the defendant's price undercuts average
variable cost, the court will presume intent, and the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that its pricing was justified without regard
to anticompetitive effect. 62 However, if price exceeds average varia-
ble cost but undercuts average total cost, the plaintiff must intro-
duce independent evidence of intent in order to establish a prima
facie case. 63 A later Ninth Circuit case, Transamerica Computer v.
IBM,64 added a third prong: even if price was above average total
cost, the plaintiff could prove a prima facie case by merely produc-
ing "clear and convincing evidence" 65 of predatory intent.
The Inglis court initially justified the intent requirement by an
analogy, steeped in Supreme Court precedent, to the criminal law of
attempt, where "intent is used to confine the reach of an attempt
59 id at 1027.
60 Id at 1035. "Anticipated benefits" and "justification" refer to the defendant's
expectations. Therefore, predatory intent occurs when the defendant's price cannot be
justified without regard to its exclusionary effect. The defendant's state of mind may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. When inferring intent from conduct, the
court will look to the "defendant's rational expectations." Id. at 1034.
61 Id at 1035.
62 Id at 1036.
63 Id at 1035-36. When it applied this framework to the case at hand, the court
found that the verdict for the plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence. The
weight of the evidence showed that price was not below average variable cost and the
plaintiff's evidence on intent was "inconclusive." Id. at 1038-39. The Court evaluated
the Robinson-Patman Act by the same standard as the Sherman Act claim. Id. at 1041.
64 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); see also L. SuLUvAN,
supra note 28, at 111 (some truly antisocial intents merit sanction on their own).
65 Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1388.
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claim to conduct threatening monopolization."6 6 The court never-
theless acknowledged two weaknesses of direct evidence of intent in
predatory pricing cases: 67 sophisticated firms will often avoid pro-
ducing direct evidence of intent and those statements that are most
likely to inflame a jury are merely "the clumsy choice of words to
describe innocent behavior [revealing] the inveterate tendency of
sales executives to brag to their superiors about their competitive
prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are compelling evi-
dence of predatory intent to the naive." 68 The court sought to rem-
edy these disturbing characteristics by also requiring "corroborating
conduct-" intent without predatory conduct cannot constitute a vi-
olation in the Ninth Circuit. 69 The most compelling justification for
the Ninth Circuit's intent requirement, however, is the court's very
definition of predatory pricing-pricing in which the defendant
would not engage unless the defendant expected to exclude rivals.
While the Inglis court relied primarily on a logical notion that
motive is the distinguishing characteristic of predation as opposed
to competition, the Eleventh Circuit, in McGahee v. Northern Propane
Gas Co.,70 took a different tack to justify the intent requirement. In
McGahee, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in preda-
tory pricing to run him out of the propane retail business. After
leaving defendant Northern's employ as district manager "under
contentious circumstances," plaintiff McGahee entered the retail
propane market with the help of an $800,000 loan from the Small
Business Administration (SBA).71 By February 1982, Northern had
obtained copies of the SBA loan documents and other information
regarding McGahee's finances. Before McGahee's entry, Northern
reduced its prices and circulated an internal memorandum about
taking the "offensive" and fighting "the former employee for the
market." By 1983, McGahee had captured 23% of the market and
Northern's share had dropped from 60-65% to 35%.72 Northern's
district manager referred to McGahee as "'Floyd the S.O.B.'" in
internal memoranda and set a goal for 1983 to "''[c]ontribute to
66 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1027 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), overruled on
other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905)).
67 Id. at 1028 n.6 (citing R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 189-90).
68 R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 190.
69 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028.
70 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
71 Id. at 1491.
72 Id. at 1492.
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Floyd's financial problems.' ,,73 Northern's price during the com-
plaint period was below average total cost, and McGahee introduced
evidence tending to show that it was below average variable cost.
McGahee also presented evidence that Northern's prices in other
districts were higher than in McGahee's district, and that Northern
provided free storage tanks only in McGahee's district and only after
McGahee's entry.
The trial court found that the market had low entry barriers,
that the defendant's price exceeded variable cost, and that no dan-
gerous probability of success existed. Based on these findings, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Northern, 74 deeming di-
rect evidence of intent irrelevant.75
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
there were genuine issues of fact as to both dangerous probability of
success and predatory intent. The court held that a section 2 at-
tempt violation requires only two elements: specific intent to
achieve a monopoly and a dangerous probability of success. 76 The
court further held that derivation of profit from predatory pricing
satisfies the requirement of specific intent. The Eleventh Circuit
then laid out a three prong test for predatory pricing quite similar to
the Ninth Circuit's test. First, a price above average total costjusti-
fies no inference of intent; in such a case, the intent requirement
must be met by independent evidence. Second, a price below aver-
age total cost constitutes some evidence of intent, but the plaintiff
must adduce additional independent evidence of intent to survive
summary judgment. And third, a price below marginal cost gives
rise to a rebuttable presumption of intent.77 To justify the intent
requirement, the court turned to the language and history of the
antitrust statutes, as well as to relevant Supreme Court precedent. 78
The court concluded from the legislative history, the "public outcry
73 Id Like Inglis, McGahee involved no direct evidence of intent.
74 McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas, Co., 658 F. Supp. 189, 195-97 (N.D. Ga.
1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
75 frd at 192.
76 McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1493. Other courts have imposed a conduct element; the
Eleventh Circuit, in allowing a showing of predatory pricing to fulfill the intent element,
has an implicit conduct element.
77 Id. at 1504 (average variable cost may serve as a proxy for marginal cost). When
the court applied the test, it found genuine issues of fact as to both elements. Id. at
1504-05. Regarding specific intent, the court found that the price was dearly below
average total cost, and possibly below average variable cost; even assuming price was
above average variable cost, there was sufficient independent evidence of intent to get to
a jury. Id. As to dangerous possibility of success, the court found Northern's 60-65%o
share at the beginning of the complaint period (the time during which McGahee alleged
Northern engaged in predatory pricing) sufficient to justify a jury finding. Id at 1505-
06. Therefore the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
78 Id, at 1496-1502.
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in 1890 against monopolies," the "Congressional concern with the
economic and political power of large combinations[,]" and from
"common sense[,] ... that Congress intended for subjective [read
'direct'] evidence of a defendant's intent to be relevant. ' 79 The
court found additional support for its view on intent from early
Supreme Court precedent, 0 and the criminal law of attempt.8 ' As
for the role of modern economic theory, the court stated:
an original Congressional intent of using evidence of a defen-
dant's subjective [read "direct"] intent is not to be ignored today
just because the science (art?) of economics has made great
strides since original passage of the statutes. Economics provides
the means for evaluating the facts, not the elements of an antitrust
violation.8 2
Finally, the court considered "[t]hree recent Supreme Court cases"
on predatory pricing.83 The Eleventh Circuit found two of these
cases, Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort, Inc.8 4 and Matsushita Electric Industries
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,85 to be neutral on the issue of intent. In the
third case, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,86 the Supreme Court
relied on intent evidence in imposing liability for predatory pricing
under the Robinson-Patman Act.8 7 From the Utah Pie decision the
Eleventh Circuit inferred Supreme Court support for an intent re-
quirement for predatory pricing under the Sherman Act.
In sum, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits both require an intent
element for predatory pricing violations under section 2 on the
grounds of logic, legislative history, and Supreme Court precedent.
Contrary to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the First and Sev-
enth Circuits believe that countervailing concerns outweigh the fac-
tors supporting an intent requirement. In Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp.,88 the First Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
federal circuit court of appeals to find intent irrelevant to predatory
pricing. Plaintiff, Barry Wright Corporation (Barry), alleged that
defendant, Pacific Scientific Company (Pacific), had monopolized
79 Id at 1500. The court also found that Congress intended that average total cost
be the highest level of price that could be used to infer any specific intent.
80 Id. at 1497.
81 Id. at 1496 n.23, 1497. Recall that the Inglis court also relied on the law of at-
tempt and early Supreme Court precedent. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
82 Id. at 1500 n.29.
83 Id. at 1501.
84 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
85 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
86 386 U.S. 685 (1967). This case is not terribly recent.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 180-86.
88 724 F.2d 227 (lst Cir. 1983).
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the market for "snubbers. '8 9 Grinnell, a major snubber user
alarmed by growth in Pacific's already large market share, endeav-
ored to create an alternative source of snubbers by entering into a
contract with Barry to produce snubbers. Barry fell drastically be-
hind the contract schedule. Seeing an opportunity to prevent entry,
Pacific offered Grinnell a long-term contract to supply Grinnell's
snubber requirements at very attractive prices. Grinnell, correctly
interpreting Barry's delays as a material breach, cancelled its con-
tract with Barry and accepted Pacific's offer. Barry ceased its efforts
to produce snubbers and brought suit.90 The district court entered
judgment for Pacific and the First Circuit affirmed.
The parties did not dispute that Pacific possessed monopoly
power, or that it had acquired that power in a lawful manner.91
Thus, the sole issue before the court was whether Pacific had main-
tained its power through "exclusionary" means.92 Barry's evidence
showed that Pacific gave special discounts to Grinnell and insisted
on a long-term contract with a non-cancellation clause. The parties
stipulated, however, that Pacific's price was always above both aver-
age total and marginal cost, and the First Circuit held that that alone
justified a defense verdict.
In so holding, the court specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's
Transamerica ruling that clear and convincing evidence of intent may
constitute a predatory pricing violation, despite a price above aver-
age total cost.93 Judge Breyer, writing for the court, reasoned
that such above-cost price cuts are typically sustainable; that they
are normally desirable (particularly in concentrated industries);
that the "disciplinary cut" is difficult to distinguish in practice;
that it, in any event, primarily injures only higher cost competi-
tors; that its presence may well be "wrongly" asserted in a host of
cases involving legitimate competition; and that to allow its asser-
tion threatens to "chill" highly desirable procompetitive price
cutting.94
The court asserted that pricing above average total cost cannot de-
ter or eliminate an equally efficient rival, and that limit pricing is not
89 Id at 229 (snubbers are shock absorbers for pipe systems, used here in nuclear
power plants).
90 It seems Barry never produced a single snubber. Id
91 During the complaint period, Pacific's share rose from 47% to 94%o. Id.
92 Id. at 230.
93 Id. at 231 (rejecting Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983)). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
94 Bany Wright, 724 F.2d at 235-36. But see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying




anticompetitive. 95 Furthermore, even assuming that a price above
total cost can be anticompetitive, surely the disadvantages of
prohibiting such prices (i.e., administrative difficulties in enforce-
ment and disincentives to cut prices) outweigh the very rare benefit,
and therefore justify a rule of per se lawfulness where price exceeds
average total cost. 96
Although the First Circuit provides for an affirmative defense of
non-predatory intent, it will not consider evidence of intent to sup-
port a prima fade case of predatory pricing.97 The court banished
direct evidence of intent for three reasons: mere "intent to harm" is
too "vague;" 98 the defendant's predatory expectations may be in-
correct because the effect of one firm's prices partially depends on
the reactions of its competitors;99 and sophisticated defendants will
engage in strategic behavior so as not to produce any direct evi-
dence of predatory intent.100 Having disposed of direct evidence,
the court proceeded to kill off intent altogether: "[i]f [intent] is
meant to refer to a set of objective economic conditions that allow
the court to 'infer' improper intent .... using Occam's razor, we can
slice 'intent' away." 101 In other words, the costs of direct evidence
outweigh the benefits, and circumstantial evidence of intent is es-
sentially evidence of conduct, not of intent, and should be admitted
only as such.
In A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms Inc. ,102 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals joined ranks with the First Circuit in effec-
tively eliminating intent as an element of predatory pricing viola-
tions. The plaintiffs apparently alleged that the defendant, Rose
95 Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233-34. For a discussion of limit pricing, see supra notes
16-18 and accompanying text.
96 Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 234-35 (this is arguably dicta because Pacific's prices
were also above marginal cost, and no commentator suggests that serious anticompeti-
tive effects can result from such prices).
97 Id. at 232 (price below marginal cost lawful if intended as "promotional" or if
firm "expects costs to fall when sales increase"). Although the court's holding is limited
to prices above both average total and marginal costs, the court's language implies that
it will not consider evidence of intent in any predatory pricing case. Id
98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655, 659-77 (1982)).
100 Id.
101 Id (citations omitted). Applying these principles to Pacific, the court found that
even under Transamerica there was no violation. It appeared likely that Pacific's price
cuts were profitable in the short run because they enabled Pacific to use more of its
excess capacity at a lower cost. Hence, there was no clear and convincing evidence that
Pacific's prices could not be justified without regard to their exclusionary effect. Id. at
236 (the court seems to leave open the possibility that objective indicators of intent may
be admissible if they are relevant to conduct).
102 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990).
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Acre, attempted to monopolize the egg processing market. 10 3 The
trial judge granted Rose Acre's motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict,' 0 4 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Between 1978 and 1982, Rose Acre, a "vertically integrated egg
producer and processor,"' 0 5 more than doubled its sales.' 0 6 Be-
cause total sales in the market grew at the modest rate of approxi-
mately 1%o per year, one can infer that most of Rose Acre's growth
resulted from business it lured away from competitors. Plaintiffs
presented evidence of price, cost, and intent. Plaintiffs' expert testi-
fied that Rose Acre's price was below average total cost for the en-
tire complaint period, and that during 1980 it was below average
variable cost. Plaintiffs also produced direct evidence of intent, in-
cluding a statement by Rose Acre's president to one of the plaintiffs:
"'We are going to run you out of the egg business. Your days are
numbered.' "107
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, struggled with how to
distinguish predation from hard competition. He started from the
premise that the antitrust laws exist solely for the benefit of consum-
ers.108 If this is absolutely correct, then the distinction between pre-
dation and competition becomes very important; the law must not
deter any price cuts that will not be successfully predatory, because
all price cuts benefit consumers in the short run and are therefore
prima facie lawful. The court identified three possible tools for de-
tecting predatory pricing: cost, intent, and recoupment. The court
concluded that cost-based tests have definite disadvantages: prices
below cost often have competitive justifications, and the different
types of costs are very difficult to measure, especially marginal cost
103 The opinion never characterized the § 2 claim as either an attempt or a com-
pleted offense. However, since Rose Acre never acquired monopoly power it is fair to
assume an attempt claim. Id. at 1399-1400.
104 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 680 (S.D. Ind.
1988), aft'd, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990). Accord-
ing to the district court, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate Rose Acre's long-run incre-
mental cost, the market was competitive, the plaintiffs' revenues grew markedly during
the complaint period, and several other firms entered the market and prospered. Id. at
687-91.
105 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1397. Because the plaintiffs were all merely "processors,"
we may conclude Rose Acre was one of the first to vertically integrate backward into egg
production. IM. at 1398. Furthermore, it appears that Rose Acre was the first firm to
automate production. Id. at 1404.
106 Il at 1398.
107 Id
108 Id. at 1400. This goal is inconsistent with an allocative efficiency goal (the tradi-
tional Chicago School goal) when price is lower than both marginal cost and average
total cost. The evidence in the case does not reveal whether Rose Acre's prices fell
within this zone of conflict. Note also that this is clearly not a unanimously accepted
view of the goals of the antitrust laws. See infra subpart III (A).
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and variable cost. Moreover, the appropriate type of cost varies
with both market structure and mode of production. The court
eventually concluded that the best place to start when testing for
predation is with the likelihood of successful recoupment: an unsuc-
cessful predatory scheme should be lawful because consumers will
be better off than if there had been no predation attempt at all. 0 9
The court found intent to be useless in evaluating a predatory
pricing claim. First, where recoupment is impossible, intent evi-
dence is unnecessary. Furthermore, even where recoupment is pos-
sible, intent is of no use. Direct evidence is too vague, and thus
presents a high risk of penalizing legitimate competition. 110 Direct
evidence also increases the complexity and cost of litigation by en-
couraging scavenger hunts through reams of documents and intro-
duction of many of them into evidence; the increased complexity
confuses judge and jury, clouds the "real economic questions," and
leads to inaccurate application of the antitrust laws."' Judge Eas-
terbrook acknowledged the traditional use of intent in antitrust to
"disambiguate... evidence.""12 However, because intent evidence
is likely to be just as ambiguous and costly as conduct evidence, he
concluded that the burden outweighs the benefit of even the tradi-
tional use of intent." 3 On a more basic level, Judge Easterbrook
implied that there can be no predatory intent inconsistent with a
competitive intent, and therefore any "smoking gun" memo is un-
fairly prejudicial to the defendant, not to mention irrelevant. 14
This definitional ambiguity apparently convinced the court to elimi-
nate circumstantial evidence of intent as well.
In short, the First and Seventh Circuits eliminated the intent
element for several ideological and practical reasons. The tradi-
tional use of direct intent evidence is misguided because direct evi-
109 But see Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 99, at 665. Note also that consumers pay the
economic dislocation costs if the predator drives himself out of business.
110 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402 ("a desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely consis-
tent with ... competition").
11 Id.
112 Id.; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
113 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402.
114 Id But see Indiana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores 864 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir.
1989) (court held there was a specific intent element to predatory pricing § 2 attempt
violation); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp. 615 F.2d 427, 432
(7th Cir. 1980) (court explicitly considered "other factors" besides cost). Both of these
cases found no violation, so Judge Easterbrook is correct in characterizing their treat-
ment of intent as dicta. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402. However, this dicta is clearly and
unabashedly contrary to the Rose Acre holding. Applying these principles, the court
found that Rose Acre, an expanding firm without market power, could never have
recouped in an unconcentrated and stagnant market characterized by low entry barriers.
Therefore, the granting of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was affirmed. Id. at 1403-04.
1262 [Vol. 76:1242
NOTE-PREDA TORY PRICING
dence is vague, unfairly prejudicial, burdensome, confusing, and
likely to encourage many non-meritorious claims by overly litigious
plaintiffs; the definition of predatory intent is too vague; the defen-
dant's expectations may be implausible; and sophisticated defend-
ants will avoid producing such evidence. Having established the evil
of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence quickly falls for one of
two reasons: either because the circumstantial evidence is already
admissible as evidence of conduct, as the Barry Wright court implied,
or because predatory intent is indistinguishable from competitive
intent, as the Rose Acre court stated.1 15
The split among the circuit courts of appeals asks whether there
is a role for intent to play in predatory pricing analysis under section
2. If there is, then how and when should intent be used? As this
Note will show, the answer to the first question suggests the answer
to the second. The first question, however, poses several threshold
issues: What prices are predatory under section 2? Is intent useful
in finding those prices? Do any considerations unique to the legal
process prohibit an intent element?
III
ANALYsIs
The goals of antitrust law support the utility of intent and they
also reveal what types of pricing practices the antitrust laws pro-
scribe. Once antitrust goals isolate those prices that are predatory,
economic theory dictates that, in a world of perfect information,
intent is a helpful and necessary tool in detecting some of those
predatory prices. Finally, legal factors such as consistency, adminis-
trability, and truth-finding confirm the theoretical conclusion on the
utility of intent. In sum, intent is necessary and beneficial to preda-
tion analysis in certain situations.
A. Goals of Antitrust
The goals of antitrust fall into three categories: political, wealth
transfer, and allocative efficiency. Of these three, only the political
goal directly supports an intent requirement. All three goals, how-
ever, indirectly further the intent debate by isolating certain pricing
practices as violative of the Sherman Act, the detection of which is
aided by considering the defendant's intent.
115 Note that the Barry Wright opinion is both more vague and more flexible than
Rose Acre as it seems to hold open the possibility of admissible circumstantial evidence as
evidence of the conduct prong. In contrast, the Rose Acre opinion clearly bans all evi-
dence of intent and considers price and cost data to be the only relevant evidence of
conduct. Therefore, despite its literal harshness, the Barry Wright opinion would allow a




The political goal contains two prongs, fairness and economic
democracy. The fairness prong directly supports the utility of intent
by focusing concern on the prey's well-being. The economic de-
mocracy prong indirectly supports intent by identifying a preferred
market structure and disfavored pricing practices that cannot be
successfully attacked without using intent.
The fairness prong derives from the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, and has been noted by many commentators ' 6 and
cited by the McGahee court.'1 7 At its coie, the fairness prong seeks
to preserve a "national morale,"' 8 created by competition, through
protection of small firms and entrants in their justifiable reliance on
prior pricing practices of dominant firms."19 The small competitor
and entrepreneur must be encouraged and not excluded by unfair
means.1 20 The fairness concept focuses on price cuts that are mali-
cious reactions to entrants and rivals. Only the dominant firm's in-
tent can capture the reactive nature of a price cut.
Danger lurks, however, in overemphasizing the fairness prong.
To be sure, one commentator has expressed the view that some ex-
tremely anticompetitive intents ought to be unlawful even when the
accompanying conduct is not very anticompetitive.' 21 The antitrust
goals, however, tend toward a broader social policy. Clearly, the
116 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN PoLrics AND OTHER
ESSAYS 199-200 (1965); William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy
for Prevention of Predatoy Pricing, 89 YALE LJ. 1 (1979); Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at
786-88; Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191-94 (1977); Oliver E. Williamson, Preda-
tory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 284 (1977).
117 McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1497-98 (lth Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1024 (1989).
118 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 116, at 200.
119 Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 776-78. Senator Sherman described the Sher-
man Act as a "bill of rights" and a "charter of liberty." 21 CoNG. REc. 2461 (1890).
Some have gone so far as to liken the Sherman Act to the Due Process Clause and assert
that it was intended to protect local firms from absentee ownership. See Thurman Ar-
nold, The Economic Purpose of Antitrust Laws, 26 Miss. LJ. 207 (1955). It seems to be
understood that the Sherman Act does not protect inefficient rivals; however, efficiency
is left undefined. See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1965).
120 More direct support for an intent element can be found in the inclusion of the
attempt offense in section 2. This can be viewed as expressing the sentiment that trying
to monopolize is illegal, even without the effect of monopoly. The evil here may not be
an anticompetitive effect, but moral culpability. However, because case law requires a
"dangerous probability of success," see, e.g., McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1505, for an attempt
claim to be made out, one goal of the attempt offense is additional deterrence. Still, in
all other areas of the law of attempt, the requirement of intent serves as something of a
substitute for the conduct or effect required in the completed offense.
121 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 111.
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Sherman Act was-not meant to be an intentional tort for rivals. 122
The common law of many states provides for business torts.123 The
antitrust laws provide private plaintiffs with standing to sue mainly
in order to increase enforcement, not to compensate them as victims
of tortious behavior.
The economic democracy prong stresses decentralization of
economic power.'2 4 Some scholars have phrased the focus of this
prong as the competitive process: preservation of rivals pushing
one another to their least cost output.12 5 Essentially, economic de-
mocracy seeks to protect a societal interest, rather than a rival's in-
terest, in competition and against massive accumulations of
economic power. In Senator Sherman's words, "[i]f we will not en-
dure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over
the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of
life."' 1 6 This theory finds support in the early case law. 12 7 Further-
more, the legislative history clearly expresses a fear of concentration
and a desire for democracy and decentralization in the marketplace.
The main import of this prong, translated into modem eco-
nomic terms, lies in its preference for an atomistic market structure
with firms no larger than necessary to achieve the minimum efficient
scale. This preference counsels against all pricing practices that
may exclude efficient rivals or potentially efficient entrants.' 2 8 In
brief, the political goal directly supports the utility of intent via the
fairness prong's characterization of antitrust as an intentional tort
for rivals, and provides a preference for a decentralized market
structure via the economic democracy prong. The wealth transfer
and allocative efficiency goals also support similar structures, pro-
tect similar firms, and therefore proscribe similar pricing practices.
Subpart III (B) will show that intent is necessary to detect these
prices.
122 Interview with Daniel Booker, head of Antitrust Litigation Group at Reed, Smith,
Shaw & McClay in Pittsburgh (Oct. 8, 1989).
123 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(Vermont tort for predatory pricing); Old Colony Donuts v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 368 F. Supp. 785, 787 (D. Mass. 1974) (providing business tort for interference
with contract under Massachusetts state law if "conducted with malice"). Sce generally,
Note, supra note 2, at 622-28 (discussion of state law business torts).
124 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 116, at 199-200; Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1153-54 (1981); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MicH. L. REv. 213, 242 (1985) (societal in-
terest in economic democracy ought to be a factor in the broader wealth transfer goal).
125 Blake &Jones, supra note 119, at 383-84; Fox, supra note 124, at 1154.
126 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890), quoted in McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1498.
127 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
128 See supra subpart I (A) (such undesirable pricing practices include setting prices
above average total cost in optimal capacity and limit pricing scenarios).
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2. Wealth Transfer Goal
The wealth transfer view maintains that Congress primarily in-
tended consumers to have a "rightful entitlement" to the consumer
surplus triangle 129 that exists at the perfect competition price.18 0
This theory has recently been stressed in reaction to both the cur-
tailed enforcement of antitrust laws regarding mergers by the Rea-
gan administration and the continuing rise of the Chicago School
theories to prominence in the law. The wealth transfer goal also
relates to monopolization, because a necessary prerequisite to the
competitive price is the presence of enough firms in the market,
operating at their least cost output, to clear the market.' 31 The
wealth transfer goal advocates decentralization and preservation of
a certain number of smaller firms without sacrificing productive
efficiency.13 2
By negative implication the wealth transfer school proscribes
the elimination of firms that would tend to contribute to a competi-
tive market. This class of firms includes equally efficient firms that
appear to be less efficient because of a lag time associated with en-
try, and even some inefficient firms that would put downward pres-
sure on the dominant firm's price.13 3 As has been shown, prices
above average total cost in optimal capacity and limit pricing scena-
rios can exclude such firms.134 Subpart III (B) will show that these
prices, proscribed by the wealth transfer theory, are undetectable
129 The consumer welfare triangle is the amount of money consumers would pay for
goods, but do not have to. Graphically, it is the triangle under the demand curve whose







130 Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 65, 70 (1982).
131 In other words, the goal contemplates enough firms operating at their lowest
costs to satisfy the quantity demanded when the price equals the lowest cost.
132 Interestingly enough, the opinions in Barry Wright and Rose Acre appear to es-
pouse a wealth transfer theory as well. Both opinions stress the goals of consumer wel-
fare maximization and, in Rose Acre, lowest price or, in Barry Wright, competitive price.
133 Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 745, 790.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11; see also Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at




without intent. A similar analysis applies to the allocative efficiency
school.
3. Allocative Effciency Goal
The chief proponent of the wealth transfer theory maintains
that there was no Congressional intent favoring allocative effi-
dency.'35 However, some commentators 3 6 assume, and Professor
Bork has attempted to prove, 3 7 that in passing the Sherman Act
Congress primarily intended to achieve an efficient allocation of re-
sources, where the cost to society of producing a good equals the
price society is willing to pay for it. Allocative efficiency refers to the
socially optimal allocation of resources, and exists when the price of
a good equals the social cost of producing the last unit (marginal
cost). When allocative efficiency is achieved, the total welfare of so-
ciety is maximized. Any variation from allocative efficiency pro-
duces a deadweight loss and calls for dedicating more or less
resources to the production of the good. 38 If price exceeds margi-
nal cost, then more resources should be dedicated to the production
of the good; output will rise, price will drop, and marginal cost will
rise.1 39 In contrast, when price is lower than marginal cost, re-
sources should be diverted from the production of the good; output
will drop, price will rise, and marginal cost will drop. 140
Allocative efficiency has dominated predatory pricing analysis
as a goal of section 2, especially in academic commentary. Although
none of the cases in the split explicitly espouses this theory, courts
that use a variation of the Areeda-Turner test do so at least implic-
itly, since the Areeda-Turner test purports to further the goal of al-
locative efficiency. These courts include the Ninth Circuit (Inglis
and Transamerica) and the Eleventh Circuit (McGahee).
While the economic democracy prong of the political goal and
the wealth transfer goal seem to prefer more drastic price cuts (all
the way down to the lowest point on the average total cost curve)
than the allocative efficiency goal (only down to marginal cost,
which exceeds the lowest point on the average total cost curve ex-
cept in markets characterized by perfect competition or extreme ex-
135 Lande, supra note 130, at 83.
136 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1075 (1979) (efficiency is primary goal).
137 Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966).
138 F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 459-64.
139 This type of allocative inefficiency is associated with monopolies.
140 This type of allocative inefficiency occurs during the price cutting period of pred-
atory pricing.
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cess capacity),14 1 these three goals actually coincide. Economic
democracy and wealth transfer prefer a price equal to minimum av-
erage total cost only when the market is near perfect competition
and that situation is allocatively efficient. Hence, economic democ-
racy and wealth transfer are actually subsets of allocative efficiency.
All three goals approve of the perfect competition price and output,
but that combination can be reached only by a critical mass of small
firms operating at their lowest cost points, not by a dominant firm
cutting price to decrease the number of firms in the market.
How is one to know if a firm's price cut, especially one that
keeps price above average total cost (as will often be the case in
optimal capacity and limit pricing scenarios), constitutes predation
or competition? To be sure, the distinction is difficult to draw in
practice. As a general matter, the predator's output will increase,
while the competitor's output will decline. Sometimes, however, a
competitor's output will initially increase, making the competitor
appear to be a predator. While the Bary Wright court did not even
attempt it, the Transamerica court felt that intent might aid in draw-
ing the line. Subparts III (B) & (C) of this Note will show that the
Transamerica court triumphs in both theory and practice.
Only the fairness prong of the political goal directly supports
the utility of an intent requirement. On the other hand, careful
analysis will reveal that an intent element fulfills the economic de-
mocracy prong of the political goal, the wealth transfer goal and the
allocative efficiency goal.
B. Theoretical Tools for Detecting Predatory Pricing and the
Vital Role of Intent
A court may employ any or all of three possible tools in a preda-
tory pricing case: the relation between price and cost, the plausibil-
ity of recoupment, and predatory intent. This subpart will show that
the inability of the price/cost relation and the recoupment test to
isolate certain proscribed pricing practices necessitates considera-
tion of intent evidence in predatory pricing cases. 1 42 The main diffi-
culty with the price/cost relation is that courts tend to employ it as a
,bright-line test, while it works best when used as one factor in rule
of reason analysis. As a test, recoupment fails-both in and of itself
141 One commentator has shown that even pricing that excludes only inefficient ri-
vals can be allocatively inefficient. Scherer, supra note 6, at 883-89. But see Easterbrook,
supra note 22, at 297-304.
142 The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence of intent is irrelevant
to subpart III (B) because this theoretical inquiry assumes perfect information with no
evidentiary difficulties. We simply know whether intent exists.
1268 [Vol. 76:1242
NOTE-PREDA TORY PRICING
and in conjunction with price/cost-because it is a negative indica-
tor; it merely tends to show where predation does not occur. Intent
is a positive indicator: where predation is possible, intent tends to
show that it actually is present.
1. Relation Between Price and Cost
The Areeda and Turner test is like the Venus de Milo: it is much
admired and often discussed, but rarely embraced. 143
Areeda and Turner, other commentators, and most circuit
courts advocate a price/cost relationship test for predatory pric-
ing. 144 The Areeda-Turner test deems a price below average varia-
ble cost as predatory, when output is in the range where marginal
cost exceeds average total cost. At greater outputs, however, the
test deems prices below average total cost as predatory. Areeda and
Turner adopted allocative efficiency as their goal, which led to them
select marginal cost as the trigger for predatory pricing. However,
since marginal cost is very difficult to determine in litigation, Areeda
and Turner advocated the use of average variable cost as a proxy.
Areeda and Turner abandoned marginal cost as a trigger at outputs
where it exceeds average total cost, because they believed that pred-
atory pricing in such a form was very rare, and even more rarely
anticompetitive.145
The Areeda-Turner test, by itself, has many problems from a
theoretical standpoint. 146 First, average variable cost is not a good
proxy for marginal cost; it starts above, then converges with, and
finally falls below marginal cost.147
[Areeda and Turner] argue that a marginal cost test will optimize
143 McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas, 858 F.2d 1487, 1495 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1024 (1989).
144 See supra notes 49 & 50.
145 Areeda & Turner, supra note 11, at 704-09. Some say that average variable cost
is a good test on its own (not as a proxy for marginal cost) because a rational firm will
shut down in the short run if price is below average variable cost. When price is below
average variable cost the firm cannot cover its fixed costs if it operates.
146 See Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 756 (the test ignores the "essence" of preda-
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social welfare. Then they admit that it will not. They argue that a
marginal cost test is easier to apply then [sic] a long-run welfare
maximizing test; then they suggest surrogates because marginal
cost data is impossible to come by. 14 8
The test focuses on allocative efficiency in the short run, but it is a
matter of some doubt whether firms plan for the short run or the
long run, and it is certainly better policy to maximize efficiency in
the long run.149 When one tries to find a price level that maximizes
long run allocative efficiency, the analysis becomes much more com-
plex. There will be cases where total welfare will be maximized by
price above marginal cost, and there will also be cases where welfare
will be maximized by a price below marginal cost.' 50
Areeda and Turner deliberately made their test underinclusive;
they consciously designed the test not to catch all forms of preda-
tory pricing. It successfully identifies most predatory pricing in an
excess capacity situation, 15 1 where the test deems predatory prices
below average variable cost. At these prices a nonpredatory expla-
nation is very unlikely because it is irrational for a profit maximizer
to operate at such prices. However, the test fails to identify preda-
tory pricing in an optimal capacity or limit pricing scenario, 5 2 be-
cause at these output levels Areeda and Turner require a price
below average total cost in order to find predation. It is possible,
however, that a price above average total cost here will deter entry
by efficient firms. 153
Areeda and Turner did not mean to say that predatory pricing
can not take place outside their test, rather they believed it a better
148 In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 994 (N.D.
Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d. 1377 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
149 See Scherer, supra note 6, at 880, 885; see also Darius W. Gaskins,Jr., Dynamic Limit
Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306 (1971).
150 Scherer, supra note 6, at 883-89.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
152 Compare Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 750 (arguing that if a deep pocket is
perceived, a predator with excess capacity may be able to deter an equally efficient rival
without violating the test) with Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (where court found no liability against
defendant with excess capacity whose price exceeded average variable and marginal
cost, but was below average total cost). See also In the Matter ofE.I. duPont de Nemours,
96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (no liability for limit pricing); William G. Shepherd, Anatomy of a
Monopoly (II): The Power to Control Prices, 12 ANTITRusT L. & ECON. REV. 73 (1980).
153 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. Areeda admits this. P. AREEDA &
H. HOVENEAMP, supra note 6, at 714.1b. The Ninth Circuit also agrees. Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955
(1983). Compare In the Matter of E.I. duPont de Nemours, 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (no
liability for limit pricing) and California Computer Products v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 743




policy choice to let predatory pricing outside their test go unpun-
ished because they felt it would be rare and not anticompetitive. 154
However, predatory pricing in these scenarios is much more likely
to occur than is excess capacity predatory pricing. Excess capacity
usually results from a recession in the market, when entry is already
unlikely. Also, predatory pricing is much easier and more rational
when no losses are incurred and the requisite increase in output is
minimal. Finally, limit pricing is more rational if management's goal
is increasing market share rather than maximizing profits. 155
Areeda and Turner retorted that if entry does occur and price
drops below average total cost, their test will catch it.156 This retort
fails because it requires a potential entrant to risk exclusion and
enter the market to trigger the rule. In addition, it is not the mo-
nopolist, but the entrant, who causes the price to undercut average
total cost. It is problematic to punish the monopolist for something
it did not cause, and if we enforce the rule strictly, severe excess
capacity could develop in the market. On the other hand, if we do
not enforce the rule at all, then the regime will deter efficient poten-
tial entrants. Therefore, the law needs an additional element to dis-
tinguish predatory from competitive pricing in such cases-the
element of intent. 157
The Bany Wright court asserted that, in the optimal capacity and
limit pricing scenarios where the test is triggered by average total
cost, those potential entrants that may be lawfully excluded are only
those that are less efficient than the monopolist. The assertion
holds only if the efficient potential entrant can depend on the un-
lawfulness of price dipping below average total cost. The dangers
of this rule have already been explored. 158 By contrast, if the effi-
cient potential entrant can not count on this illegality (i.e., believes
the monopolist will maintain its output level), it may be deterred
from entering because it will be stuck with the residual demand left
by the monopolist which will usually be insufficient to support a new
entrant. 159
154 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 891, 892 (1975); see also In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F.
Supp. 965, 995 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983) ("Areeda and Turner have made a
policy judgment. The economic analysis used to justify that judgment is incomplete,
and the judgment itself stands contradicted by the economic, political, and social poli-
Lies of the Sherman Act.").
155 See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 35 n.68 and sources cited therein.
156 Scherer, supra note 6, at 873 (recounting communication with Areeda and
Turner).
157 Id at 875.
158 See supra text accompanying note 127.
159 Scherer, supra note 6, at 872-75.
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Predatory jurisprudence must consider the inefficient entrant
who may become efficient, especially in light of the political goal of
the Sherman Act. A lag time due to a learning curve or need for
brand identity tempts one to label a potentially efficient entrant inef-
ficient. 160 This lag time makes the entrants more vulnerable to
predatory prices that do not violate the Areeda-Turner test. There-
fore, intent can be useful in ferreting out this type of predatory
pricing.
The Barry Wright and Rose Acre courts asserted that predation
moves price in the right direction as far as the antitrust laws are
concerned and, therefore, courts should be loathe to deter price
cutting. 161 This of course begs the question: what constitutes the
"right direction" as far as the antitrust laws are concerned? If we
are referring to allocative efficiency, then price cuts toward marginal
cost, but not below it, constitute the "right direction." As stated
above, the Areeda-Turner test does not actually use marginal cost as
the trigger; it uses average variable and average total cost, and
neither is a good proxy. If wealth transfer is the goal, the right di-
rection is toward the least cost point (the lowest point on the aver-
age total cost curve), to where a perfectly competitive market would
lead firms. But to get to this point, a monopolist must allow entry
by equally efficient firms; otherwise the monopolist can continue to
reap supracompetitive profits. Entry, and therefore perfect com-
petition, is more likely if the dominant firm charges higher, profit
maximizing prices. So, while it is generally beneficial in the short
run under any goal when the dominant firm lowers prices, it is in-
deed possible for the price to be too low in light of long run
consequences.
In sum, "ease of application is a poor argument for adopting a
rule that admittedly ignores important considerations of economic
efficiency, especially when the main justification for that rule is eco-
nomic efficiency."' 162 In fact, there is no version of a price-cost test
which could, on its own, fulfill any of the antitrust goals.
2. Recoupment
The Rose Acre 163 and Matsushita 164 cases point out that assessing
160 Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 745 n.15, 789-90.
161 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983).
162 In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 965, 993
(N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
163 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401.
164 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986).
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the plausibility of recoupment can be quite helpful in the detection
of predatory pricing.165 To determine recoupment plausibility, one
must look at the structure of the market and the defendant's capac-
ity and market power. Substantial entry barriers, risky nature of the
business, inelastic demand, specialized assets that are difficult to
sell, practical requirement of entry through sequential submarkets,
and a dominant, non-innovative firm all tend to render a market
more susceptible to recoupment.166
However, there are problems with the plausibility of recoup-
ment as a test by itself. First of all, recoupment analysis is a negative
indicator. Recoupment analysis can identify whether predatory
pricing can succeed, but the potential success of a predatory pricing
scheme does not mean that the defendant actually engaged in pred-
atory pricing. Therefore, recoupment is best used as a threshold
test. 67
Equally important, courts 68 and scholars 69 have reached no
consensus on what conditions are necessary for recoupment. Be-
cause economists can not say with any certainty what conditions ab-
solutely must be present to make recoupment a possibility,
borderline cases will arise where other relevant factors must tip the
balance.
In fact, the actors in the market may be the ones best situated to
evaluate recoupment plausibility. 70 Because they operate daily in
the market, they have seen firms come and go as well as thrive and
dominate. They certainly are much more familiar than are judges
and academicians with the factors that tend to make a market more
prone to recoupment. This argument gains force when one consid-
ers that if courts do not admit the actor's belief about recoupment,
the trier of fact must make the judgment on its own or with the guid-
165 See also Inter City Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,948 (D.
Minn. 1976).
166 Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 19, at 223-34; see Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at
742-43.
167 Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 19, at 242-58.
168 Note that Rose Acre gives only sparse guidance for subsequent cases. The court
merely found (correctly I think) that on the facts of the case before it, recoupment was
impossible. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1403 (determinant factors were "persistent entry,"
"stagnant market," and an "unconcentrated" market structure).
169 Compare P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, 711.2a with Zerbe & Cooper,
supra note 99, at 674-77. Each of these pieces supplies a slightly different list of condi-
tions and method of weighing them.
170 See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 996
(N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983) ("The monopolist's own evaluation of the situa-
tion, whether it thought it was cutting losses or cutting throats, can help to clarify the
nature of the acts under taken.").
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ance of an expert witness who may be a novice to the particular
market.
3. Intent
As the discussions of price/cost and recoupment illustrate,
these indicators, without more, constitute an incomplete test for
predatory pricing schemes. Beyond the very rare case where price is
below average variable cost, the price/cost relation can show merely
that predatory pricing is more or less likely, but not whether it is
truly present. When recoupment analysis works well it reveals
where predation cannot exist, but it is useless as a positive indicator.
When these two tests can only say that predation is possible, and
when they cannot conclusively pronounce impossibility, intent can
help immensely in the final determination as a positive indicator.
The Barry Wright court asserted that intent cannot shed light on
the likelihood of successful predation because the effect of pricing
behavior depends on the reactions of the monopolist's competitors
and not on the defendant's expectations.17 ' But even the propo-
nents of this view acknowledge that the reaction of competitors is
merely one factor of many in markets with some measure of concen-
tration. 172 Indeed, the traditional use of intent in antitrust is to dis-
ambiguate conduct. 173 That is, where conduct can be characterized
either as lawful or unlawful, intent can help break the tie. As ap-
plied in a predatory pricing case, intent can help when recoupment
is plausible and where the price/cost relation is consistent with both
predation and hard competition: "The monopolist's own evaluation
of the situation, whether it thought it was cutting losses or cutting
throats, can help to clarify the nature of the acts under taken.'174
Moreover, predatory pricing may be aimed at excluding not ex-
isting competitors but rather potential entrants; the monopolist can
control the reactions of potential competitors with relative ease
through preemptive entry deterrence. 175 In such a case, potential
competitors' reactions are, for the most part, dictated by the domi-
nant firm's intent. Logically, it is easier to deter a potential entrant,
who has no sunk costs to lose, than an established rival who does
have sunk costs it may lose by exiting. Furthermore, there are cer-
171 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983)
(citing Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 99, at 659-77).
172 Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 99, at 660-61.
173 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); MCI v. AT&T, 708
F.2d 1081, 1123 n.59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (cited in A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1326 (1990).
174 IBM Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. at 996.
175 Limit pricing falls into this category.
1274 [Vol. 76:1242
NOTE-PREDATORY PRICING
tain scenarios where competitors' reactions may make little differ-
ence, or where the competitors have no choice but to exit or, in the
case of a potential entrant, not to enter.176 This may occur when the
predator has a much larger scale plant or a brand name advantage.
Therefore, the Barry Wright court erred in relying on the reactions of
competitors to obfuscate the need for an intent element.
Moreover, even assuming the predator's expectations are incor-
rect, unsuccessful predation may have harmful effects. It can in-
crease costs and decrease total welfare by taking from producer and
consumer surplus. 177 In an extreme case, the unsuccessful predator
may put himself out of business. This afflicts the market with eco-
nomic dislocation costs that consumers will ultimately pay.
In brief, a test including price-cost and recoupment but not in-
tent fails to detect some predatory pricing that the Sherman Act
prohibits. As a theoretical matter, intent aids in filling the gaps left
by the other two tools.
C. Legal Factors
In theory, intent is a necessary factor in the detection of some
predatory pricing, but can it fit through the courtroom doors? The
legal system possesses its own unique concerns relating to the use of
intent. The most relevant concerns are consistency, adminis-
trability, and truth-finding.1 78 Precedent and consistency in the law
weigh heavily in favor of the intent element. Valid criticisms exist
regarding the administrability mostly of direct evidence of intent, 179
but countervailing reasons undercut the use of price/cost and re-
coupment as substitutes, making it unclear under an administrability
rubric whether the law should use all or none of the tools. Likewise,
criticisms have arisen with regard to the truth-finding value of direct
evidence of intent, but countervailing factors counsel for its use.
1. Consistency
Predatory pricing is proscribed not only by the Sherman Act,
but also by the Robinson-Patman Act.180 The Supreme Court in
176 Scherer, supra note 6, at 882-83.
177 Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 99, at 665.
178 Subpart III (B) assumed perfect information, but the legal system does not con-
form to that assumption. Evidence of intent may be hard to find and difficult to
interpret.
179 Much of the criticism also goes to the derogatory memo type of circumstantial
evidence.
180 The Robinson-Patman Act provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful ... to discrimi-
nate in price... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
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Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. '8 1 held intent relevant to preda-
tory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act. Scholars and lower
courts have almost uniformly criticized the Utah Pie opinion, but it is
still the law under the Robinson-Patman Act.'8 2 To have a single
fact situation analyzed in two different ways under the antitrust laws
makes no sense. The McGahee, Inglis, and Rose Acre courts recog-
nized this problem. McGahee and Inglis reconciled the two ap-
proaches by analyzing the Robinson-Patman Act claims with the use
of intent evidence. The Rose Acre court, however, distinguished Utah
Pie on its facts.' s3 Since Utah Pie remains viable, consistency favors
an intent element.
Furthermore, the policy of stare decisis within the Sherman Act
weighs heavily in favor of intent. Intent has always been an element
of section 2 attempt claims. Until 1981, it had always been an ele-
ment of predatory pricing claims. 184
Courts have been unwilling to drop intent as a standard entirely,
perhaps because of an understandable reluctance to never say
never when the universe is unpredictable, perhaps in deference to
the past, or perhaps in recognition that commercial megalomania,
even without market power, is, still, without redeeming virtue.'8 5
By effectively reading the intent element out of section 2 predatory
pricing claims, the First and Seventh Circuits have added to the con-
fusion in predatory pricing jurisprudence. Parties have a right to
expect clear and consistent guidance from the courts. By breaking
the rule that "[i]nferior federal courts, in order to provide equal jus-
tice under law, must apply the holdings of cases still on the books,"
the First and Seventh Circuits have violated the parties' right to
guidance. 186
2. Administrability
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes no exceptions for cases in-
volving administrative difficulty. ' 8 7
181 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (predatory pricing may be used to prove lessened competi-
tion required under the Robinson-Patman Act).
182 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990) ("Utah Pie employed the Robinson-Patman Act
to condemn the process by which competition creeps into oligopolistic markets and un-
dercuts excessive prices.").
183 Id. at 1406-08 (no price discrimination).
184 See supra note 49 and cases cited therein.
185 Jays Foods v. Frito-Lay, 656 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aft'd, 860 F.2d
1082 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1014 (1989).
186 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1405 (referring to Utah Pie).




Critics of intent fear for judicial efficiency,188 and indeed when
intent is an element one would expect that fewer cases would termi-
nate via summary judgment for the defendant because intent is a
question of fact. However, ease of summary judgment is a poor rea-
son to exclude evidence that is administrable and helps the trier of
fact. Furthermore, an intent element may actually conserve judicial
resources: fewer litigants will appeal and still fewer will obtain re-
versals because of the difficulty in reversing a decision on a question
of fact, like intent.18 9 Indeed, the greatest need for preservation of
federal judicial resources is at the circuit court of appeals level. 190
The Bary Wright and Rose Acre courts criticized the intent ele-
ment as encouraging a very costly scavenger hunt for the "smoking
gun" memo that quite often does not exist. Meanwhile, the discov-
ery burden results in wasted resources by both parties and the trial
judge, and overburdening the trier of fact with a huge number of
documents. There are two partial cures for this criticism and three
retorts. First, to ease the discovery burden, courts may bifurcate
discovery by requiring some threshold showing of price/cost and
recoupment evidence before ordering discovery for intent evidence.
Second, to avoid overburdening the trier of fact, courts may exer-
cise the balance prescribed in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to ex-
clude intent evidence if its "probative value is substantially
outweighed by... considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Moreover, intent
need not be proven by statements; conduct such as surveillance and
sham litigation can justify an inference of intent. In addition, the
burdens regarding discovery and the trier of fact caused by the in-
tent requirement are not huge in proportion to the same concerns
as they relate to price/cost and recoupment. The price/cost and
recoupment factors also mandate huge and costly discovery, includ-
ing payments to expert witnesses, a cost not associated with in-
tent.19 1 Finally, proof of intent adds complexity to all causes of
188 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (summary
judgment "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and
intent play leading roles.").
189 See Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 779.
190 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 62-65 (1985);
Louis H. Pollak, Amid Curae (Book Review), 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 822-26 (1989).
191 Another criticism from Barny Wright of the intent requirement as it is now em-
ployed is that it is useless and confusing where intent is automatically inferred when
price is below average variable cost. Yet this is simply an application of the circumstan-
tial method of proof of intent by conduct. Juries are often charged with evaluating in-
tent by circumstantial evidence in other areas of the substantive law; it is unclear why
this method of proof suddenly must overwhelm an antitrust jury. Simply dispensing




action with a scientific element, and critics have failed to justify spe-
cial treatment for section 2 predatory pricing.
Much of the administrability-oriented criticism of intent also
comes from satisfaction with the recoupment and price-cost tests.192
However, these tests have administrability problems themselves.
Four aspects of the price/cost test present difficulties in a litigation
setting: (1) average variable cost bears little resemblance to margi-
nal cost; 193 (2) there is no agreement as to which costs constitute
variable costs; 1 9 4 (3) it is "a very difficult task" to determine if the
appropriate test is average variable or total cost; 195 and (4) costs are
calculated by accounting measures which may not coincide with eco-
nomic theory (in particular the concept of opportunity cost). The
recoupment plausibility test will be quite helpful in cases where
there is an economic consensus that the conditions make recoup-
ment impossible. However, there will be close cases and cases
where recoupment is clearly possible. Where the question is close, a
judge or jury should not decide the question on recoupment alone,
because not even economists can agree on the necessary conditions
for recoupment. The court in Rose Acre gave minimal guidance, and
the average district court judge probably cannot shoot from the hip
with anything approaching Judge Easterbrook's accuracy, although
they surely can be as deadly. Wisdom counsels us not to "set sail on
a sea of doubt" by allowing trial judges to tinker with close ques-
tions of recoupment.' 96 When both the recoupment factor and the
price-cost relation are ambiguous, other relevant evidence ought to
come in to break the tie.
3. Truth-Finding
Critics fear that it is impossible to isolate whose intent is rele-
vant, that sophisticated defendants will escape liability by avoiding
the distribution of incriminating memoranda, and that intent evi-
dence is too ambiguous to help the trier of fact. These factors lead
critics to believe that incorrect results and undesirable incentives
will result from the use of intent. These criticisms carry little weight
in and of themselves. Furthermore, truth-finding difficulties associ-
192 McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 658 F. Supp. 189, 195 n.9 (N.D. Ga.
1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989) (intent is
"less likely to yield an efficient economy .... [It] might be justified if predatory pricing
were a serious problem, but ... it is not.").
193 Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 751-55.
194 See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp. 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989); Areeda & Turner, supra note 19, at 701-02.
195 Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 756 n.52 and accompanying text.
196 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd,




ated with price-cost and recoupment reveal that if intent goes, so
must price-cost and recoupment.
If the law makes intent an element, the more sophisticated
predators may engage in strategic behavior and avoid creating any
memoranda reflecting a predatory intent, arguably leaving plaintiffs
without redress against all but the sloppiest of predators. 197 While
this is a plausible scenario, upper level management may expose
themselves by monitoring and admonishing regional sales managers
with control over price about harmful memoranda. Plaintiffs may
use evidence of such activity circumstantially to infer intent. In ad-
dition, evidence of other conduct can justify an inference of intent.
The Rose Acre court criticized the use of intent to disambiguate
conduct because direct evidence of intent may be as ambiguous as
the conduct it is supposed to clarify. 198 Ambiguity of direct evi-
dence of intent arises wherever intent is an element of a case.
Where the danger of confusion outweighs the probative value of the
evidence it can be excluded under Federal Rule Evidence 403, but
there is no reason to forgo Rule 403 analysis for an across-the-board
prohibition of intent evidence.199 In a similar vein, the Rose Acre and
Barry Wright courts also expressed fear that direct evidence improp-
erly influences juries. 200 First of all, the Rule 403 balance takes prej-
udice into account. Moreover, the defendant may employ other
types of evidence such as recoupment plausibility and expert testi-
mony on the exclusionary effect of the pricing behavior to rebut in-
tent evidence. Finally, the defendant and the judge may emphasize
to the jury that there is a fine line between a predatory and a com-
petitive intent.
The Barry Wright 20 ' and Rose Acre202 courts also asserted that
the intent element supplies incentives to defendants that are unde-
sirable from a policy standpoint, such as not to cut prices and to
collude on price. This criticism overlooks that section 1 of the Sher-
man Act 203 and section 5 of the FTC Act 20 4 prohibit collusion. With
197 R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 189.
198 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir.
1989); see R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 190; In the Matter of General Foods, 103 F.T.C.
204, 342 (1984).
199 See, e.g., Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, 875 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir.
1989).
200 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227, 235 (1st Cir. 1983). The derogatory memo type of circumstantial evidence is also
subject to this criticism.
201 Bany Wright, 724 F.2d at 231-32.
202 Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402.
203 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) ("Every ... conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade ... is
declared to be illegal.").
204 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1988) ("Unfair methods of competition.., are declared
unlawful .... ").
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limiting instructions to the jury requiring a high burden of proof on
intent, such as those advocated in Transamerica, legitimate price cut-
ting is unlikely to be deterred. Indeed, incentives with an intent ele-
ment are likely to be clearer, because defendants can control their
intent, whereas the vagaries of determining costs are beyond their
control.
The Barry Wright court also feared that making intent an ele-
ment of predatory pricing would bring a tidal wave of plaintiffs with
frivolous suits. 205 Because all circuits except the First and the Sev-
enth currently have an intent requirement, the number of plaintiffs
is unlikely to increase unless the whole test for predatory pricing
becomes intent.20 6 The particular court advocating this critique fa-
vors preservation of the Areeda-Turner test alone, and rejects the
Inglis-Transamerica view that some overwhelming intent evidence
might provide a meritorious case when price exceeds average total
cost.20 7 The criticism is valid in the context presented; however,
add the safeguard of a recoupment threshold, and the danger of
overly litigious plaintiffs may significantly decrease. In addition, this
criticism too quickly assumes that wrong results will flow from intent
evidence. Moreover, intent is not a one-sided factor; it can work for
the defendant if he can rebut it with his own evidence or impeach it
by showing the ambiguous nature of the evidence. In fact, most
courts allow a defendant to justify his behavior with intent-like evi-
dence,208 such as proof that the price was promotional.
Indeed, the Areeda-Turner test gives defendants the best of
both worlds, because, as many theorists have shown and Areeda and
Turner have conceded, the test is underinclusive. The test makes it
easy for the defendant to dispose of the case at the summary judg-
ment stage because it is an objective bright-line rule. One recent
survey has demonstrated the overwhelming success rate of defen-
dants in predatory pricing cases. 209 This may imply that plaintiffs
are losing cases that they should win. However, considerable con-
troversy surrounds the issue of whether the success rate of litigated
cases truly reflects the success rate of all cases, and therefore
205 Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233-36.
206 A recent study shows that predatory pricing is the main claim in only 3.1% of
filed antitrust cases. PRIVATE ANTrTusT LIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEw LEARNING 6
(LawrenceJ. White ed. 1988) [hereinafter PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION].
207 Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233-36.
208 E.g., id. at 232; Hanson v. Shell Oil, 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
209 PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 206, at 42 (Table 1.17). Using a
broad definition of plaintiff success (including settled cases), predatory pricing plaintiffs
are the second-least successful of all antitrust plaintiffs with a success rate of 23.1%. Id
Using a narrow definition (excluding settlements) predatory pricing plaintiffs are the
least successful group of antitrust plaintiffs with a rate of 7.3%. Id
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whether the system is succeeding in getting to the truth.210 As a
matter of common sense though, the overwhelming litigation suc-
cess of defendants must have an effect on the success rate in
settlements. 211
Lastly, considerable danger lurks in incorporating a theory in
flux into law.2 12 Yet that is exactly the state of predatory pricing law
at this time. Most courts follow some version of the Areeda-Turner
test, yet that test has incurred a wealth of deserved criticism. 2 13 In
addition to the criticisms already noted, the Areeda-Turner test ig-
nores the economic concept of opportunity cost, by measuring cost
through accounting practices which can not measure opportunity
cost. The economic theory of allocative efficiency contemplates that
opportunity cost be included in marginal cost.2 14 Moreover,
although a growing minority of courts consider recoupment, the
commentary and cases about plausible recoupment do not draw a
bright line; all they can do is suggest factors. While these theories
may aid in determining the outcome of a case, unless the economics
community can agree that the fact situation in a certain case cannot
have an anticompetitive effect, the parties ought to be allowed to
bring in more relevant evidence, such as intent, with which the
courts have considerable experience.
Altogether, the goals of antitrust law, in addition to expressing
a direct preference for the intent element, target pricing practices
that theoretically cannot be detected without inquiring into intent.
Consistency within the antitrust laws lends strong support to the use
of the intent element, while the administrability and truth-finding
factors reveal that if the intent element is unworkable, the price-cost
and recoupment elements may also be. At this stage of predatory
210 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 503 (1989) ("published opinions are a skewed
subset of filed cases") (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)). The Priest & Klein article also notes that cases
that result in final judgment may be a skewed subset of those filed. Priest & Klein, supra,
at 6. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to assess success rates in setded cases. Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality Of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641, 683-84 (1987).
211 See also Brodley & Hay, supra note 11, at 793 (circuit courts' adaptation of
Areeda-Turner test has shifted litigation advantage "drastically in favor of the
defendants").
212 Id. at 741, 793-94.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 143-62.
214 EDGAR K. BROWNING &JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 185-86 (1983). But see In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.,
459 F. Supp. 626, 631 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
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pricing jurisprudence, discretion and prudence dictate the retention
of the intent element.
IV
PROPOSAL
Courts should continue to employ recoupment as a threshold
test in predatory pricing cases under section 2. When the character-
istics of the relevant market clearly reject recoupment as a possibil-
ity, the court need not look further. When the court cannot rule out
the possibility of recoupment, the court should inquire into the
price/cost relation. A price below average variable cost should re-
main presumptively predatory. However, when recoupment is a
possibility and price/cost evidence does not clearly reveal preda-
tion, the inquiry must be widened. Courts should use all of the
available evidence, including intent, to determine if a violation has
occurred. In order to more clearly illustrate this conclusion, an ap-
plication to a recent circuit case is appropriate.
V
APPLICATION
In U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp.,215 the plaintiff,
Windmere, alleged that the defendant, Philips, had illegally main-
tained its monopoly position in the rotary shaver market through
predatory pricing. Recoupment was clearly possible. Philips had al-
most total control of the market with a 90% market share. In fact,
until Windmere's entry, Philips's brand was the only one in the mar-
ket. Clearly, Philips had the capacity to supply the full market de-
mand. Furthermore, the court found "that a recognized brand
name was critical to successful entry into the electric shaver mar-
ket."' 216 The brand name requirement constitutes a barrier to entry,
one of the factors necessary for recoupment. The price/cost data
were inconclusive.2 1 7 While Philips clearly lowered its prices and
215 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (the court of
appeals reversed the directed verdict for the defendant and remanded).
216 Id. at 697.
217 id. at 700, 704-05. A caveat is appropriate here. In response to Windmere's
entry, Philips dumped older models into the market at prices far below their expected
retail price. This complicates the analysis because the expected retail price relied upon
by the court was set four years prior to Windmere's entry. If these shavers could not
fetch the same price at the time of Windmere's entry (because of technological advances,
for example) and Philips's plans were to let them sit or dump them into foreign markets
at give-away prices anyway, then an element of predation, namely the sacrifice of short
run profits, is not present. However, because there is no evidence of this, this applica-
tion will assume that Philips did sacrifice short run profits. In fact, it is plausible that
Philips had held on to these shavers for four years in order to have a weapon against
potential entrants.
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increased output in response to Windmere's entry, the litigation
failed to show the exact price/cost relation because neither party
could conclusively prove which of Philips's costs were variable. In
Windmere's opinion, price was below average variable costs, while
Philips contended price exceeded average total cost.218
Finally, there was evidence pertaining to Philips's predatory in-
tent. Memos stated an intention to "'kill this stone dead by intro-
ducing old models at very low prices'" and an exhortation to
" 'pound them into the sand.' "219 Circumstantial evidence in-
cluded a memorandum suggesting that" 'legal measures' ... should
make life difficult for Ronson [Windmere's brand] on every front
where it is at all possible[,] ' ' 220 Philips's purchase of the Schick
brand name after it learned about Windmere's negotiations with
Schick, and Philips's prompt discontinuance of its older models
when Windmere exited the market. 221
Ignoring intent, the evidence clearly fails to prove predatory
pricing. Recoupment was a possibility, but the parties' price/cost
evidence was hopelessly contradictory; the price could have been
below average variable cost or above average total cost. All that can
really be said with certainty is that soon after Windmere's entry,
Philips introduced a large number of older models at reduced
prices. Philips could justify its dumping as clearing out its old stock
to save on inventory costs. The evidence, however, supports an op-
timal capacity or limit pricing scenario where prices above average
total cost can be predatory.222 Aside from intent, the evidence
raises suspicion, but certainly does not prove a violation.
Add the intent evidence, however, and only predation can ex-
plain Philips's conduct. The evidence clearly showed Philips's in-
tent to eliminate Windmere by various means including lowering
prices and, presumably, sacrificing profits. This bore no resem-
blance to the sympathetic case of one firm surviving in a shrinking
market with excess capacity. As the court stated,
[e]vidence that a firm holding 90 percent of a market that has
substantial entry barriers drastically slashes its prices in response
to the competition of a new entrant, for the purpose and with
218 Id at 700. This is a prime example of the practical problems of the Areeda-
Turner test. The parties disputed which costs were variable and they argued over how
to allocate advertising costs reimbursed by Philips's parent corporation.
219 Id at 703.
220 Id. at 699.
221 Id. at 703.
222 Because Philips had controlled the entire market until recently, it is fair to as-
sume that it had been able to conceptualize and build the optimal scale firm. Further-
more, any attorney worth his salt would have raised excess capacity if there was a
colorable argument to be made.
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the effect of eliminating that entrant, is sufficient to show
monopolization. 223
Market demand could have accommodated Windmere, but Philips
shut Windmere down before it could surmount the brand name bar-
rier to entry.
CONCLUSION
Courts should continue to move toward imposing a threshold
test of recoupment plausibility. Further, although courts should
continue to use price/cost evidence to evaluate predatory pricing,
they should discontinue its use as a bright line test, except where
price is below average variable cost. However, when price/cost and
recoupment yield no conclusion, the law should inquire further into
all three factors-price/cost, recoupment plausibility, and intent-
to correctly characterize the defendant's conduct.
Steven R. Beckt
223 Windmere, 861 F.2d at 704.
t I extend heartfelt gratitude to Professor Kenneth Elzinga for fostering my
fledgling interest in antitrust law, and to Professor George Hay for suggesting the topic
of this Note and giving me hints and advice along the way. All mistakes and transgres-
sions are, however, my own.
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